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Green grabbing and the dynamics of local-level engagement with
neoliberalization in Tanzania’s wildlife management areas
Kathryn E. Green and William M. Adams
This paper analyzes the politics and struggles ongoing within wildlife management areas
(WMAs) in Tanzania to discuss the dynamics of neoliberalization of the wildlife sector.
We discuss neoliberalization as a new political-economic context within which the
ongoing politics of natural resource management are played out, and focus on green
grabbing as an expression of these politics. We discuss how local-level actors are
engaged in these processes, often in strategic ways, to negotiate their roles within
WMAs and address green grabbing by the state. Secondly, we discuss an example of
the politics of land control and local-level actors’ enactment of accumulation by
dispossession within a WMA.
Keywords: green grabbing; Tanzania; wildlife management areas; politics of natural
resource governance; engagement with neoliberalization; nature-state-territory
Introduction
Debate about the nature of neoliberal conservation and the complex processes of neoliber-
alization in the environmental sector (e.g. Harvey 2005; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Kelly
2011; Peluso and Lund 2011) has included discussion of the wide range of actors involved
and the injustices of associated processes of ‘green grabbing’ (Castree 2010; Fairhead,
Leach, and Scoones 2012). There is a growing literature that considers the way local
actors engage with the sweeping changes being brought about by neoliberalization,
respond to this changing context and resist green grabbing (e.g. Benjaminsen et al. 2013;
Gardner 2012). In this paper, we contribute to this literature by examining the dynamics
of neoliberalization of the wildlife sector of Tanzania, focusing on the local level and the
emergence of new forms of engagement with processes of green grabbing and accumulation
by dispossession.
We focus on community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), as
implemented in Tanzania in a new wildlife policy in 1998 through the creation of wildlife
management areas (WMAs). Tanzania’s adoption of CBNRM in the late 1990s followed
policy change across eastern and southern Africa in search of models to address both
rural development and wildlife conservation (Hulme and Murphree 2001; Nelson 2010;
Nelson and Agrawal 2008). Income from game viewing tourism and (except in Kenya)
tourist hunting has been the common focus of CBNRM policies across the region, but it
has taken a variety of forms in different countries. In some there has been a degree of devo-
lution of resource rights and control (Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe), while in others there
has been little (Zambia, Mozambique, Kenya and Tanzania, Nelson and Agrawal 2008). In
all cases, donor support has been considerable, but in Tanzania (and these latter countries),
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strongly centralized governance and lack of transparency have limited donor pressure to
decentralize the control of resources (Nelson and Agrawal 2008).
Research on neoliberalization and CBNRM has tended to focus on the nature and
impacts of green grabs (e.g. Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Gardner 2012), the
impacts of such processes on local people (e.g. Büscher and Dressler 2012) and the creation
of new, neoliberal environmental subjects (e.g. Fletcher 2010). Here, we aim to extend the
understanding of the role local-level actors play in neoliberalization by considering the way
they are engaged (cognitively and politically) in the processes of neoliberalization. We also
examine the extent to which these dynamics and processes should be seen as a product of
neoliberalization. Here, we draw on the longstanding and wide-ranging literatures on the
politics of natural resource management and participatory development to ask what has
changed under neoliberalization. In their discussion of green grabbing, Fairhead, Leach,
and Scoones (2012) argue that what distinguishes neoliberalization from previous discus-
sions of the politics of natural resource management is the number and variety of different
actors involved, and the focus on novel forms of valuation and the commodiﬁcation of
nature. Here we investigate how these changes have altered such politics of natural resource
management.
We begin by outlining neoliberalization in nature conservation, and green grabbing in
the context of CBNRM. Next, we frame this within a discussion of the politics of natural
resource management and the struggles taking place around this. Using examples from
Tanzania, we then build on previous discussions of green grabbing in WMAs to frame
the wider dynamics of neoliberalization. We emphasize, ﬁrstly, the role of local actors in
these processes and, secondly, the interactions between these processes and longstanding
struggles over natural resource management that span the local, national and international
levels.
The paper is based on ﬁeldwork by the ﬁrst author in Tanzania from March–August
2010 and January–June 2011. Data collection included qualitative interviews with actors
across all levels of WMA governance, including ministry ofﬁcials, regional and district
authorities and Authorized Association Consortium members (see below). The ﬁndings
also draw on interviews and a focus group carried out at the local level with Authorized
Association representatives and leaders, village authorities and local people during an in-
depth investigation of one WMA in southeastern Tanzania.
Neoliberal conservation, green grabbing and community-based natural resource
management
Neoliberalization needs to be understood as a multifaceted and dynamic process that
involves a wide range of both state and non-state actors across different levels (Castree
2008, 2010; Harvey 2005). A growing literature explores the implications of neoliberaliza-
tion (an ongoing and unﬁnished process involved in the testing, application and revision of
neoliberal philosophy; Castree 2010) for biodiversity conservation, and analyses the result-
ing ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Igoe and Brockington 2007; Kelly 2011; Sullivan 2013).
Neoliberal conservation is market-driven, and consists of the reregulation of nature
through commodiﬁcation, the spread of free markets to manage these commodities and
the development of a ‘green economy’ (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012; Igoe and
Brockington 2007). It involves the opening up of areas of land for capital accumulation
under the paradoxical assumption that the tense relationship between capitalism and the
environment can be solved through the latter’s complete integration into the capitalist
system, resulting in growth, improved efﬁciency, development, democracy and
98 Kathryn E. Green and William M. Adams
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sustainability (Büscher et al. 2012; Castree 2010; Kelly 2011). A critical aspect of neolib-
eral conservation is the reduced role of the state in the management and conservation of
nature, and a larger role and increased collaboration with other organizations, including
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private enterprises (Castree 2010; Igoe and
Brockington 2007). These new collaborations and alliances are described as the creation
of new, hybrid forms of environmental governance, in which responsibility for the conser-
vation and management of the natural world is no longer assumed to be the responsibility of
the state, but instead involves both state and non-state actors (Igoe and Brockington 2007;
Peck and Tickell 2002).
CBNRM is the devolution of authority to manage natural resources, often involving the
granting of tenure rights, to autonomous local/community institutions, based on three core
principles of participation, empowerment and decentralization (Dressler et al. 2010; Hulme
and Murphree 2001). The connections between neoliberalization and CBNRM are
complex; the enrolment of communities in ofﬁcial systems of natural resource management
reﬂects neoliberalism’s mobilization of non-state actors, but also opens the possibility of
solidarity-based resistance to processes of privatization and market extension (see also Li
2007). However, CBNRM is compatible with neoliberalism’s philosophy of a reduced
role for the state in natural resource management (or a reduced role for national govern-
ments with the devolution of powers to local governments), and often involves the devel-
opment of close relationships with the private sector (e.g. tourism companies and NGOs).
Moreover, the expansion of capitalism involves natural resources being commodiﬁed
and traded in markets (Kelly 2011), and such markets are a common feature of CBNRM
(e.g. for wild products or tourism). Such markets need not be novel: Tanzania, for
example, has operated a national and international market for wildlife hunting since the
colonial era, pre-dating neoliberalization by decades (see Leader-Williams, Kayera, and
Overton 1996; Siege 2001). However, as in other African countries, the neoliberalization
of the wildlife sector has developed these markets, and brought local communities into
engagement with them (Nelson 2010). In Tanzania, WMAs now allow local communities
to hold formal rights to manage wildlife resources and to beneﬁt ﬁnancially from tourist
hunting and game viewing tourism facilities.
CBNRM therefore represents a hybrid form of environmental governance that merges
neoliberal ideas of private markets (Dressler et al. 2010; Peck and Tickell 2002) with
populist arguments for participatory development (Mohan and Stokke 2000). The adop-
tion of CBNRM in Africa from the 1980s reﬂected a global ‘turn’ in conservation policy
towards saving nature through ‘win-win’ strategies that involved nature ‘paying its way’
(Adams 2004; Dressler and Büscher 2008; Dressler et al. 2010; Goldman 2011).
CBNRM seemed to promise ‘a world in which it is possible to eat one’s conservation
cake and get a development dessert too’ (Grandia 2007, 480) by handing power to
local communities and giving them access to the markets generating revenue from wild-
life resources. However, the proposed ‘win-win’ outcomes from CBNRM are not easily
achieved and not uniformly distributed (Büscher and Dressler 2012; Dressler and
Büscher 2008; Dressler et al. 2010; Frost and Bond 2008; Selfa and Endter-Wada
2008; Sikor and Nguyen 2007). Across eastern and southern Africa, patterns of elite
patronage and rent-seeking, allied with a lack of transparency in the allocation of
hunting contracts and consequent beneﬁts, have encouraged a high degree of centralized
control of wildlife resources, except in one or two cases (notably Namibia, Nelson and
Agrawal 2008).
Green grabbing is a term that denotes the privatization or appropriation of land and the
exclusion of local people from natural resources on the basis of ‘green’ credentials
The Journal of Peasant Studies 99
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(Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012). Green grabbing arises from neoliberalization’s drive
for privatization, resulting in what Marx described as primitive accumulation,1 and Harvey
(2005) discusses as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Accumulation by dispossession
involves the ‘commodiﬁcation and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of
peasant populations’ (Harvey 2005, 159), bringing about capital accumulation for some
at the expense of others. Primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession
apply not only to physical enclosure of land and physical removal of people, but also to
changes in access, rights, institutions and rules as a result of commodiﬁcation, as well as
the restructuring of authority and human-ecological relationships (Fairhead, Leach, and
Scoones 2012; Kelly 2011). It is in this respect that we investigate accumulation by dispos-
session, drawing on Kelly’s (2011, 686) description of how local communities engaged in
CBNRM are entrained in the neoliberal processes of engaging natural resources with the
market and ‘at the same time relieving local people of their land/resources while…
[they] become dependent on an industry (often ecotourism) over which they have no
control and from which they earn very little money’.
Previous research has argued that green grabbing has taken place in Tanzanian WMAs
through three processes of dispossession of local actors (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012):
ﬁrstly, the continual restriction of grazing land (see also Gardner 2012; Patinkin 2013); sec-
ondly, a loss of control over crops due to an increased level of wildlife-related damage; and,
thirdly, through the emergence and institutionalization of markets for wildlife resources
over which local communities have little control. In this paper, we develop this analysis,
focusing on the third of these processes of green grabbing.
The politics of nature-state-territory in natural resource management
Struggles over land, authority and natural resources are not new in Tanzania. Issues of
access and property regarding natural resources are intimately tied to the exercise of and
struggle over power and authority (see Gardner 2012; Sikor and Lund 2009). The enclosure
of land for conservation purposes has previously been discussed as a critical component of
statecraft (Neumann 2004), and the devolution of rights to manage natural resources has
been widely discussed in terms of the recentralization of power that may emerge (Ribot,
Agrawal, and Larson 2006). The politics of devolved natural resource management are
therefore well known (see Nelson 2010), and, arguably, the institutional blending involved
in such public-private-community arrangements as CBNRM allows the state to extend its
capacity to achieve public conservation policy outcomes (Hodge and Adams 2012).
Land and authority over natural resources have long been central to both state-society
and nature-society relationships in the politics of what Neumann (2004) terms ‘nature-state-
territory’, Peluso and Lund (2011) term ‘land control’ and Vandergeest and Peluso (1995)
discussed as ‘internal territorialization’. Such processes of struggle, however they are
termed, involve multiple actors, not just the state, in negotiations and contestations that
set the rules which allow and disallow certain forms of land use and access (Sikor and
Lund 2009). We follow Neumann (2004) in using the term ‘nature-state-territory’ to
1Following Kelly’s (2011, 685) deﬁnition of primitive accumulation as ‘the act of enclosure of a
commons, whether that be the enclosure of land, bodies, social structures or ideas… Primitive
accumulation may also be the creation of capital for the ﬁrst time through the commodiﬁcation of
things that previously lay outside the realm of capitalism’.
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describe a complex set of relationships including state-society and nature-society relation-
ships with respect to territory and enclosure.
In Tanzania, these politics have a long and complex history, indicating important shifts
in state-society and nature-society relations over the twentieth century. This has been the
subject of extensive discussion (e.g. Brockington 2002; Goldman 2003, 2011; Nelson
2007) and such politics are clearly not conﬁned to Tanzania (see Nelson and Agrawal
2008), but we focus here on this case to contextualize our own ﬁndings.
The politics of nature-state-territory in Tanzania were ﬁrst documented in relation to the
processes of enclosure and displacement under colonial policies of social control and spatial
segregation, in which protected-area enclosures ﬁxed boundaries between nature and
culture, and ultimately between society and the state (Neumann 2001, 2004). Centralized
control over natural resources has been the norm in Tanzania since the ﬁrst game reserve
was gazetted in 1896 (Nelson, Nshala, and Rodgers 2007; Siege 2001) and, to this day,
the state retains ownership of all wildlife resources, even if communities now have the
right to manage them in WMAs (Government of Tanzania (GoT) 2009). The history of
evictions and colonial appropriation of land have created tense and untrusting relationships
between the state and local populations, particularly amongst pastoral groups displaced by
protected areas (Brockington 2002; Goldman 2003) and blamed for environmental degra-
dation (Walsh 2012). Access to rural land and resources was further reshaped, and service
delivery to rural areas was reduced by the policy of Ujamaa or villagization, in which over
75 percent of the population was relocated into planned settlements between 1967 and 1975
(Coulsen 1982). Ujamaa, however, was also the ﬁrst step in securing the legal rights of the
village, rather than central government, to be responsible for land and natural resources
(Nshala 2002).
The management of wildlife resources, and the responsibilities and relationships
between the state and local communities, changed signiﬁcantly in the 1980s, a product
of both the introduction of neoliberal reforms and a growing political agenda in Tanzania
for multi-party democracy, human rights and good governance (Mniwasa and Shauri 2001).
In 1985, Tanzania’s acceptance of the International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment
Programme for induced privatization reduced the role of the state in service delivery and
brought a huge inﬂux of foreign capital and donor-funded projects in the wildlife sector
(see Neumann 1998). Around the same time, important shifts in the policy environment2
and a 1984 amendment to the constitutions formalized institutions and rights of local gov-
ernment, established village land as a legal category and authorized village authorities to
manage natural resources on that land (Mniwasa and Shauri 2001; Nshala 2002).
These factors were important in the shift towards community conservation in Tanzania
(see Igoe and Croucher 2007; Nelson 2007), ﬁrst seen in the Serengeti Regional Conserva-
tion Strategy in 1985. However, the politics and struggles surrounding devolved natural
resource management continued (Mustalahti 2007; Nelson 2010). In WMAs, these political
struggles centred on: (1) the devolution of power to local communities, and how this is
recentralized, controlled and restricted by the state, particularly through the application pro-
cedure to create a WMA and a lack of autonomy of the local level in managing a WMA; (2)
the complex revenue-sharing arrangements in place and inequalities in beneﬁt distribution;
and (3) the often disappointing outcomes for community development (Humphries 2013;
Nelson 2007; Nelson, Nshala, and Rodgers 2007).
2Speciﬁcally, a Local Government Act introduced in 1982, and a Land Act and Village Land Act both
introduced in 1999.
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The processes of green grabbing that have drawn so much attention in recent years
should be seen in the context of these ongoing politics of nature-state-territory in Tanzania.
Two key points need to be made about green grabs: ﬁrst, they are not homogeneous or
single events, but are processual, involving ‘a series of changing contexts, emergent pro-
cesses, forces and contestations’, and are under constant negotiation regarding access
(Peluso and Lund 2011, 669); second, the role of local actors is central to these struggles.
Green grabbing does not happen to local communities as an undifferentiated whole, but is
continually negotiated among local actors. Gardner’s (2012) discussion of struggles
between local groups, private investors and the state in the context of tourism in Tanzania
is a good example of these political interactions. Local groups have seized on the neoliber-
alization of Tanzania’s wildlife sector as an opportunity to regain authority over land and
the beneﬁts that can be derived from wildlife resources in an active challenge to state auth-
ority, and to address previous injustices (Gardner 2012). Here, we provide evidence of the
shifting parameters of these struggles and the politics of nature-state-territory as local actors
get involved with the processes of neoliberalization, and try to ﬁnd ways to beneﬁt from
these changes and to challenge the inequalities of green grabbing taking place within
WMAs.
Tanzania’s wildlife management areas
WMAs were created across Tanzania from 1998, under the Wildlife policy for Tanzania
(GoT 1998). A WMA is deﬁned as ‘an area set aside by a village government for the
purpose of biological and natural resource conservation’ (GoT 1998, 35). The 1998 wildlife
policy introduced CBNRM in the wildlife sector in Tanzania, providing a legal mechanism
‘to allow rural communities and private land holders to manage wildlife on their land for
their own beneﬁt’ (GoT 1998, 14), with the aim that participating communities would
have the ‘full mandate of managing and beneﬁtting from their conservation efforts’ (GoT
1998, Statement 34). Day-to-day management of a WMA is conducted by an elected
group of local actors (who form the Authorized Association) in accordance with a manage-
ment plan.
WMAs reﬂect the neoliberalization of the wildlife sector through the reduced role of the
central state in wildlife management, and the central idea that communities receive econ-
omic beneﬁts through investment agreements for the consumptive and non-consumptive
use of natural resources (most commonly through tourist hunting and photographic
tourism enterprises). This was intended to make wildlife management a competitive form
of land use, and thereby incentivize the sustainable management of wild animal populations
(Nelson 2007). WMAs depend on the commodiﬁcation of wild animals and the marketing
of the resulting products in order to generate revenue that can be targeted at the local level.
In WMAs, local communities become partners in business ventures, wildlife resources are
commodiﬁed and markets for these are expanded (Igoe and Croucher 2007).
WMAs are involved in markets for wildlife commodities in two ways: ﬁrstly, through
tourist hunting taking place on areas of land gazetted as hunting blocks; secondly, through
investment agreements between Authorized Associations and private investors for non-con-
sumptive uses of wildlife (such as photographic tourism). Figure 1 shows the revenue
system that was in place at the initiation of WMAs in 1998, and subsequent changes.
These arrangements correspond to what might be called ‘green grabbing’ in WMAs set
out by Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) in both streams, as described below.
Commercial tourist hunting in Tanzania has taken place since the 1960s, with a short
hiatus between 1973 and 1978 (Leader-Williams, Kayera, and Overton 1996). The
102 Kathryn E. Green and William M. Adams
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
am
br
idg
e U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:2
1 1
0 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
Wildlife Division, which has overseen the tourist hunting market in Tanzania since 1984,
has been widely criticized for its opaque system of hunting block allocation, opportunities
for corruption and rent-seeking and for the expansion of state control and inﬂuence over
investments in the wildlife sector (Baldus and Cauldwell 2004; Benjaminsen and Svarstad
2010; Gardner 2012; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Leader-Williams, Baldus, and Smith 2009;
Nelson et al. 2009). Within this political economy of wildlife management, it is unsurpris-
ing that central government ofﬁcials have been reluctant to devolve power or revenue col-
lection arrangements to the local level (see Nelson and Blomley 2010). A former pilot
project member of staff described how colleagues found the initiation of WMAs ideologi-
cally challenging and uncomfortable because it involved a shift in attitude from one of
‘enforcers controlling populations’ to one of ‘working with them as colleagues’. This
caused serious doubts and resistance to WMAs within the Wildlife Division, which a
member of staff explained led to a situation where ‘whilst they ofﬁcially praised it,
[they] tried to sabotage the whole operation’ (interview, 2011). Another former pilot
project member of staff recalled that during participatory discussions with the Wildlife
Division around policy development, certain areas were off limits to discussion, particu-
larly regarding authority for tourist hunting (decision-making and revenue arrangements),
over which the central authorities were unwilling to relinquish control (interview, 2010).
As a result of these politics, tourist hunting in WMAs has excluded local communities
from both decision-making and revenue collection, and simultaneously created the exclu-
sion of local people from village lands. The responsibility for allocating hunting blocks,
issuing hunting concessions and collection of tourist hunting revenue remained with the
Wildlife Division, despite promises that WMAs would phase out this state control and
initiate locally managed tourist hunting (Benjaminsen et al. 2013).
Figure 1. Revenue sharing arrangements in WMAs and changes 1998–2012.
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One of the main beneﬁciaries of the commodiﬁcation of wildlife resources and the
development of markets for wildlife tourism has been the Tanzanian state, and individuals
within government organizations (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Commercial tourist
hunting is the Tanzanian Wildlife Department’s chief source of revenue (a recent article
in the New York Times, published 17 March 2013, by the Director of Wildlife in Tanzania
exempliﬁes this importance), but also a major element in patterns of patronage and rent-
seeking (Leader-Williams, Baldus, and Smith 2009; Nelson and Agrawal 2008). Whilst
this hunting took place on village land within hunting blocks inside WMAs, villagers
had no role in the management of this system for tourist hunting. Between 1998 and
2012, just 25 percent of revenue generated from tourist hunting was channelled back to
the district level, and then shared with the participating villages in the WMA (although
with little opportunity for Authorized Associations to hold the District Authorities or Min-
istry to account on this score; see Baldus and Cauldwell 2004; Gardner 2012; Sachedina
and Nelson 2010). The second major beneﬁciary of the system for tourist hunting in
WMAs has been the private safari hunting industry, often internationally owned.
Gardner (2012) argues that the granting of hunting rights by the state to private business
investors amounts to green grabbing through the ‘foreignization of space’ (Zoomers
2010): the exclusion of people from village lands in the interests of the conservation of
game animals, which international operators’ paying clients have the sole right to shoot.
This territorialization is direct and enforced: as one informant commented: ‘when we see
villagers in our area, we chase them and, if we catch them, we beat them, we beat them
hard. They know now not to come’ (interview with tourist hunting operator staff
member, 2010).
Importantly, arrangements for allocating hunting revenue underwent a signiﬁcant shift
in 2012 with the publication of updated WMA Regulations (URT 2012, see Figure 1).
These stipulated that Authorized Associations would receive 75 percent of the hunting
block fee, 5 percent of the game fee, conservation fee and observers fee and 15 percent
of the permit fee paid by tourist hunting operations, URT 2012). WMAs with a designated
hunting block now publicize opportunities and negotiate directly with tourist hunting oper-
ators (although a representative of the Director of Wildlife and state authorities at the Dis-
trict level must be involved in scrutinizing the tendered investments, and the Director of
Wildlife within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism must sanction the agree-
ment before the Authorized Association signs; URT 2012, Article 51).
The second source of revenues in WMAs comes from investment agreements for non-
consumptive wildlife tourism (such as tourist lodges). These kinds of arrangements had
existed on village land prior to the initiation of WMAs, and had been an important
source of income for some villages, with the most lucrative agreements generating up to
USD 40,000 annually (Benjaminsen et al. 2013). However, the central state (and its func-
tionaries) had no say in these investments and was unable to beneﬁt from this revenue,
prompting a change in the rules (Igoe and Croucher 2007). In 2000, the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Tourism published an amendment to the Wildlife conservation
(tourist hunting) regulations which declared that all investment agreements within any
wildlife Protected Area (including hunting blocks and WMAs) required written approval
by the Director of Wildlife (MNRT 2000). This change was signiﬁcant because it declared
all previous such investment agreements to be illegal, extending the authority of the state
over these lands (despite their legal status as village lands), dispossessing local commu-
nities of the rights to autonomously set up such agreements and dispossessing them of
this means of generating revenue from wildlife resources. However, it should also be
noted that this change does bring a beneﬁt of protection for local communities from
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unfair investments from which they would not beneﬁt adequately, and also serves to protect
the environment from damaging investments (A. Songorwa,3 personal communication,
2011).
This move by the state was undoubtedly designed to encourage investments through
WMAs instead of individual villages, but Figure 1 highlights that such non-consumptive
investment agreements within WMAs, through the Authorized Associations, also under-
went a similar process, again comprising green grabbing. Non-consumptive investments
in a WMA are subject to a tender system and are assessed by a Tender Evaluation Com-
mittee made up of members of the Authorized Association, the district authorities and a
representative of the Director of Wildlife (URT 2012, Articles 49 and 50). In the original
revenue arrangements, Authorized Associations received 100 percent of the revenue gen-
erated from these agreements. However, the Non-consumptive wildlife utilization regu-
lations were revised in 2008 (GoT 2008), to reduce the share of revenue kept by the
Authorized Association from 100 percent to 65 percent: the remaining 35 percent went
to the central state.
As a result of these changes, local actors can only enter investment agreements to
manage or beneﬁt from wildlife resources with approval from the Director of Wildlife in
the Ministry. The central government has thereby extended its authority over lands
within WMAs and restricted the role of local actors in decision-making over these lands
and, furthermore, these changes have dispossessed local actors of a signiﬁcant proportion
of the revenues from such agreements (see also Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012;
Gardner 2012).
Changing state-society relationships and response to green grabbing
As communities respond to the changing opportunities in WMAs, and the processes of neo-
liberalization they unleash, both nature-society and state-society relations change. We
address this by considering the changing relationships and power patterns around the gov-
ernance of WMAs.
The neoliberalization of Tanzania’s wildlife sector and the creation of WMAs have
brought about various changes in natural resource governance and in relationships
between state and society. First and foremost, they set out a reduced role for the central
state and transfer of authority for wildlife resource management to local communities. In
reality, this shift in state-society relations has been only partial and contested, as the gov-
ernance arrangements in WMAs and a large literature on the politics of power devolution in
WMAs have clearly shown. The value of wildlife resources, the long history of centralized
control in the wildlife sector and the substantial opportunities for rent-seeking surrounding
wildlife resources have all contributed to delayed or restricted devolution, or have recentra-
lized power (see Igoe and Croucher 2007; Nelson et al. 2009). State-society relationships
have remained tense and contested over the issue of authority to manage wildlife resources.
Secondly, the initiation of WMAs created opportunities for new alliances between local
communities and NGOs, as each WMA is assigned an NGO facilitator to support the WMA
and its Authorized Association. The NGO facilitator is involved in the application for and
gazettement of the WMA, and the production of a management plan; the NGO provides
technical advice to the Authorized Association, is charged by the Wildlife Division with
3Professor Alex Songorwa is a former member of staff within the Wildlife Division and, at the time of
this interview, was the Head of the Department of Wildlife at Sokoine University of Agriculture.
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conﬂict arbitration for the WMA and participates in an advisory board for the WMA that is
involved in decisions to appoint non-consumptive investment agreements (URT 2012,
Article 28). NGO facilitators may also act as a liaison between central ministries, district
authorities and local communities (URT 2012). These new collaborations are an example
of the hybrid forms of environmental governance that are an integral part of neoliberaliza-
tion as a broader range of actors become involved (see Peck and Tickell 2002), and they
represent important shifts in the relationships between state and non-state actors.
Local actors and members of Tanzania’s Authorized Associations recently began to use
these collaborations to position themselves to bring about change in the governance system
for WMAs and to address the green grabbing that has been taking place. In 2010, a new
organization was formed, named the Authorized Association Consortium (GoT et al.
2011), made up of representatives of WMAs across the country and facilitated by the inter-
national conservation NGO Worldwide Fund for Nature, with funding provided by the
United States Agency for International Development. The ofﬁcial objective of the consor-
tium was declared to be ‘liaison with government, non-governmental organizations and/or
private sectors in all matter [sic] that affect the consortium positively or negatively. These
included development policies, legislations, guidelines, community development and dis-
tribution of land and natural resources’ (GoT et al. 2011). The purpose of the consortium
was to act as a forum for the uniﬁcation of processes and systems in WMAs across the
country, and also to provide a platform for Authorized Associations to present a coherent
voice of WMAs to central government, increasing their inﬂuence at the national level and
their role in the governance system for WMAs (A. Songorwa, personal communication,
2011). The chairman of one Authorized Association suggested that the consortium could
be seen as ‘the equivalent of the National Park Authority for WMAs in Tanzania…
which has the power to speak to government and the ministry’ (Interview, 2011).
Through the Authorized Association Consortium, local actors have a channel through
which to claim a legitimate voice in national-level decision-making, and members of the
Consortium have begun to use this opportunity to challenge the institutional arrangements
and access arrangements for wildlife revenues in WMAs. These claims to authority are
evident in the consortium’s ambition, expressed in a poster produced by the Authorized
Association Consortium about its work, to achieve ‘secured markets for different tourism
products in the WMAs… representing Authorized Association members in decision
making during wildlife quota allocation… [and] having favourable environment [sic] for
investment in WMAs’ (GoT et al. 2011).
It is interesting that the consortium’s ofﬁcial objective particularly mentions engaging
in issues of land and natural resource distribution, whilst the expected beneﬁts of the con-
sortium refer speciﬁcally to gaining Authorized Association members’ representation in
decision-making bodies over wildlife quota allocation for tourist hunting (see also Author-
ized Association Consortium 2013). Both of these issues have been central to the struggles
taking place within the politics of nature-state-territory for decades. It is not surprising that
local actors are attempting to effect change on these very issues, but it is important that neo-
liberalization, by opening up opportunities for collaboration with NGOs and shifting the
state-society relations for wildlife management, has provided the context to enable these
attempts to be made.
The Authorized Association Consortium allows local actors to engage not only with the
national state regarding wildlife resources, but also with the system of power and authority
within WMA governance. The Consortium is a vehicle by which local actors can position
themselves to legitimately challenge the green grabbing that has been enacted by the state in
the form of centralized control of tourist hunting and non-consumptive wildlife
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management in WMAs. Local actors were engaged in attempts to rearrange the governance
system, redeﬁne their authority and redistribute access to decision-making and beneﬁt dis-
tribution in their own interests. Neoliberalization (by facilitating community management
of natural resources, bringing these actors into national and international markets for wild-
life resources, and through the facilitation of close relationships with other non-state actors)
has played a key role in enabling this engagement, and it is also the framing within which
actors are operating.
It has long been recognized that actors will deliberately adopt different discursive
frames to suit their political motivations and personal interests (Brockington 2004). In
the wildlife sector of Tanzania, Gardner (2012) argues that neoliberalization is being
embraced by local actors and perceived as an opportunity to challenge the state with
respect to ongoing political struggles over land. In WMAs, neoliberalization has signiﬁ-
cantly altered the context in which these struggles over land and state-society relationships
are taking place, and the engagement of local actors within the consortium with the state
relates to both of these processes. Firstly, it is evident from the discursive frame employed
by the consortium in this literature, which shows that this engagement with the state and
resistance to green grabbing does not consist of a rejection of neoliberalization in the wild-
life sector. The discourse put forward by the consortium draws on neoliberalism’s core
concept of building market mechanisms for effective wildlife management and focuses
on the creation of investments to achieve this. The consortium should not, therefore, be
understood as a challenge to processes of neoliberalization, but as an attempt to utilize
the opportunities presented by neoliberalization to reposition the role of local actors
within WMA governance, enabling them to challenge centralized control in WMAs and
the processes of green grabbing by the central state, and address the politics of nature-
state-territory that have historically disadvantaged local people. Thus local actors are
engaged in attempts to utilize and shape neoliberalization for their beneﬁt, drawing on
the discourse of neoliberal wildlife conservation in the politics of this struggle. The
extent to which this engagement with neoliberalization is effective at bringing about
change will take time to become clear. The role of the Authorized Association Consortium
and actors linked to it, for example, in the recent changes in decision-making and revenue
arrangements for tourist hunting, is a matter of current debate.
Changing nature-society relations and local struggles over land and authority:
intra-village accumulation by dispossession
To explore the dynamics of these processes in greater depth, we investigate an act of pol-
itical struggle over land and wildlife resources at the local level. We analyse a WMA named
MBOMIPA, a Kiswahili acronym for Matumizi Bora Maliasili Pawaga na Idodi, meaning
‘sustainable use of natural resources in Pawaga and Idodi’ (the two administrative divisions
in which the WMA is located). MBOMIPA represents 21 villages (with a total population
of over 60,000) within the district of Iringa Rural, in the region of Iringa, southeastern Tan-
zania (see Figure 2). The MBOMIPAWMA is located along the eastern edge of Tanzania’s
largest national park, Ruaha, and was formerly designated the Lunda-Mkwambi Game
Control Area (Hartley 1997 and see Murphree 2000; Nelson et al. 2009; Walsh 1995,
1998, 2003). We discuss two examples from MBOMIPA that show how green grabbing
and accumulation by dispossession have been enacted by local actors.
Conﬂict over land and natural resource ownership has emerged among villages partici-
pating in the MBOMIPAWMA as a result of the commodiﬁcation of wildlife resources and
the development of markets. Conﬂict intensiﬁed following the low levels of community
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beneﬁts paid to villages: of the USD 110,000 generated by investment agreements in the
years 2009–2010 and 2010–2011, only USD 1590 and USD 5524 was given to each
village. These funds were invested at the community level in services such as health
clinics and education resources. These are an important source of revenue for local commu-
nities, and indicate that the WMA system can channel beneﬁts to local communities.
However, disappointment and conﬂict stems mostly from the small amounts received (if
the funds made available for community services are translated to a per capita ﬁnancial
beneﬁt within the local communities, the WMA generated just USD 0.55 and USD 0.20
in these years), and the lack of adequate compensation mechanisms for crop damage by
wildlife crossing into agricultural areas bordering the WMA.
When the WMA began its application for ofﬁcial gazettement in 2002, all of the 21 par-
ticipating villages were made equal partners in the governance structure, had representa-
tives within the Authorized Association, and received an equal share of WMA revenue
(MBOMIPA 2002). However, only 14 villages actually held land inside the WMA,
which was created from the southern portion of the former Lunda-Mkwambi Game
Control Area (Figure 2). The other seven had no registered village land within the
WMA. The WMA was set up in this way because it was feared that, if left out, the other
seven villages might resent the WMA and serve as gateways for hunting and illegal activi-
ties within both the WMA and the adjoining National Park (M. Walsh,5 personal communi-
cation, 2010; interviews with Authorized Association Representatives, 2011). Including the
Figure 2. Map of MBOMIPA Wildlife Management Area and participating villages.
4Conﬂicts with investors and within the WMA were responsible for the reduction in both the total
amount of revenue collected by the Authorized Association and the amount shared with the partici-
pating villages.
5Martin Walsh was a member of staff on the donor-funded project that initiated community-based
wildlife management in this location prior to the gazettement of MBOMIPA.
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additional villages in the WMA not only provided their inhabitants with opportunities to
beneﬁt ﬁnancially, but also created a buffer of protection against illegal users of wildlife.
This argument, and a vision of participatory conservation and community cooperation,
was stressed continually by members of the villages that had not contributed land to the
WMA: ‘The primary objective of the project at the start was to stop hunting’ (interview
with village chairman, 2010); ‘Those who want to change the system are only interested
in money, not in conservation’ (interview with village authorities, 2010); ‘The idea was
working together for conservation, participating together’ (interview with Authorized
Association representative, 2011); ‘MBOMIPA belongs to society, not to one village’
(interview with Authorized Association representative, 2011).
However, some of the villages with legal title to land within the WMA argued that, as
the wildlife resources that underpinned revenue occurred on their land, they should receive
a greater proportion of the revenue. This was further justiﬁed by arguments that these vil-
lages were generally closest to Ruaha National Park, and so were subject to higher levels of
crop damage and human-wildlife conﬂict. During ﬁeldwork (2010–2011), a group of repre-
sentatives within the Authorized Association, supported by members of some village coun-
cils, were attempting to bring about a change in the revenue-sharing arrangements so that
the seven villages without land inside the WMA would receive only a 10 percent share of
the total revenue.6 The 14 villages with land inside the WMA would then share the remain-
ing 90 percent. A villager from a ‘landed’ village claimed that this was necessary because
‘landless’ villages were ‘eating for free’ (interview, 2011), and an Authorized Association
representative from a landed village described his support for altering the revenue distri-
bution system because ‘here [landed villages] we are hurt by conservation, but they [land-
less villages] only know the importance of conservation, but we are all paid the same’
(focus group, 2011).
Some villages with land that was richer in wildlife claimed it should be treated as still
belonging to them, rather than as a collective or common area shared between all the vil-
lages, and threatened to leave the WMA if changes were not made. Others challenged
this commodiﬁed view of wildlife resources, arguing that ‘wild animals don’t belong to
us; they are the wealth of the state. There isn’t a single person that can say they belong
to a speciﬁc village’ (interview with Authorized Association representative, 2011).
These struggles were played out discursively at the local level as different groups
employed contrasting justiﬁcations to gain or retain control. Those who wanted to change
the revenue system territorialized wildlife as assets on their land, and drew on commodiﬁed
language in their arguments; their opponents challenged these meanings. They described
wildlife as a resource in ways that emphasized the stewardship and protection of nature,
arguing that it was not all about money, and that revenue should be shared equally because:
Those who have little are doing their work just as those that have lots of land. Will you with-
hold from them so that they are given little?…We share together because we all have one job
to protect our land so that it can be sustainable, and even those who don’t have [land], protect it.
It is something that all of us should receive equally, therefore. (interview with Authorized
Association representative, 2011)
One village, Nyamahana (see Figure 2), which had not contributed land to the WMA, was a
particular point of ﬁerce debate amongst the villages. Members of the village authorities in
6This is reported in USAID (2013) as an attempt to split revenues 70:30 between landed:landless
WMA villages, perhaps reﬂecting an amendment following the failure of the 2011 attempt.
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Nyamahana contested any change to the revenue sharing, and fought for the vital role their
village played in the success of the WMA: ‘They know the importance of our village for
conservation. The village is a gateway for hunting: MBOMIPA cannot un-invite us
because poachers would come to the village’ (focus group with Village Council and Auth-
orized Association representatives, 2010). Their discursive framing of the WMA empha-
sized cooperation and participation and described the role of landless villages as vital to
the concept of ‘good neighbourliness’.7 One informant rejected thinking about wildlife pri-
marily in terms of the revenue it can generate, arguing that
we have to learn this is not the answer because, if we go down this path, even those villages
with land are different; some of them have large areas of land but no attractions for tourists;
some of them have no business investments. If we keep thinking of it just in these terms, it
will disrupt us a lot. (interview with Authorized Association representative, 2011)
As actors from some villages attempted to remove others’ rights to land, or access to
beneﬁts, and claim an increased proportion of revenue, they enacted accumulation by dis-
possession at the local level. This was facilitated by the commodiﬁcation of wildlife
resources within theWMA, which resulted in a shift in the conceptualization of the relation-
ships between nature and society, as people viewed and valued these resources differently.
Supporters of a change to the revenue distribution arrangements argued from a very com-
modiﬁed and ﬁnancialized point of view, saying that it was their land that provided the con-
servation value of the WMA because it hosted the wildlife, and thus enabled the WMA to
survive because these resources then generate the revenue. The commodiﬁed framing of
wildlife management was well summarized by two informants, who explained that: ‘edu-
cation was needed in the communities because people didn’t understand the meaning of
the animals they were hunting. People began to learn about the money that would come
from these, and that future generations would beneﬁt also’ (interview with Authorized
Association representative, 2011); and that ‘we were educated to know that wildlife are
an opportunity for business, that can bring beneﬁts long into the future’ (interview with
Authorized Association representative, 2011).
The commodiﬁed value of wildlife resources amongst local people was evident in
common descriptions of animals as ‘wealth’ and a ‘crop’, and comparisons between
WMA management of wildlife and the management of livestock. Actors across all levels
indicated this shift by drawing on ﬁnancial and market terms to discuss wildlife resources.
A District Natural Resources Ofﬁcer described the excitement surrounding WMAs, saying
‘wildlife are “hot cakes” (Interview, 2010). The money from tourist hunting activities is
very large’. Similarly, discussions with the Chairman of the MBOMIPA Authorized
Association emphasized the commodiﬁcation and ﬁnancialization of wildlife resources in
WMAs, and the dependence of the WMA and its participating villages on the development
of markets and securing of investment agreements. When asked what he saw as the most
important objectives for the future of the WMA and what was necessary to achieve
these, he answered that MBOMIPA
needs to build two luxury camps and an airport to get lots of money. After ﬁve years, we could
get TzSh 500 million [USD 344,000] each year… There are lots of tourist activities we want to
start…We are fortunate we have these animals (Interview, 2011).
7This is a longstanding concept in Tanzanian political discourse (see Hyden 1980).
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This commodiﬁcation of wildlife resources is clear in a statement from a villager (quoted in
Walsh 2003, 25): ‘in the past, wildlife was used for bushmeat for home consumption,
whereas cattle were cash assets. Now wildlife is also a cash asset, so we see it differently’.
The discourse of commodiﬁed wildlife resources among local-level actors, and the
emphasis on market-based forms of exchange, indicates a shift in nature-society relations
brought about by neoliberalization. The conﬂict is essentially a struggle amongst local
actors to access the beneﬁts provided by the WMA. We do not claim that these struggles
are unique to wildlife management under neoliberalization; instead, we believe that these
struggles are an inherent component of the politics of natural resource management
which, in this case, have emerged within the framing provided by neoliberalization and
the changes in nature-society relations this involves.
Increasingly, villages participating in MBOMIPA have begun to look for opportunities
to negotiate investments with private companies for tourist accommodation. Tourists can
undertake game viewing inside the WMA and national park, but not tourist hunting,
which is restricted to the designated hunting block within the WMA. Some participating
villages (particularly Tungamalenga; see Figure 2) had tourist infrastructure that pre-
dated the WMA, but several expressed their desire to enter into similar agreements.
Thus, in 2011, one village council, with no prior tourist investment agreements, was nego-
tiating with ﬁve potential investors to build tourist camps on village land along the bound-
ary of the WMA.
These negotiations were driven by perceptions of wildlife as a commodity, but also by
dissatisfaction with WMA revenues. These villages saw the opportunity to use the wildlife
resources on WMA land to secure investment and revenue for their village, rather than
having to share it with other villages through MBOMIPA. These investment negotiations
fuelled the conﬂicts with other MBOMIPA villages. One informant said, ‘people are
trying to beneﬁt privately by setting up tourist enterprises, but village investors cause
much conﬂict because people disagree over whether the money should go to the village
or to MBOMIPA’ (interview with Authorized Association representative, 2011).
Members of the village council in the village that was negotiating these investments justi-
ﬁed their actions as good for both conservation and development, because the revenue that
the village received would be invested in the village, which would help to maintain support
for wildlife conservation and the continuation of the WMA.
These examples from MBOMIPA illustrate two important points: (1) accumulation by
dispossession is something carried out not only by states, NGOs and private companies, as
has previously been identiﬁed in green grabbing in WMAs, but also by local actors at the
inter-village level (in this case, through some villages trying to dispossess others); (2) these
processes are a product of the commodiﬁcation of wildlife resources and a shift in nature-
society relations, but are also part of the struggles that local actors engage in to access
beneﬁts from wildlife resources. As Peluso and Lund (2011) argue, a ‘grab’ needs to be
seen not as a separate process, but as the result of a series of changing contexts that facilitate
shifts in land control, including exclusion, territorialization and enclosure. WMAs have
altered this context, bringing areas of wildlife land into a capitalist network of market-
based exchange, thereby creating opportunities for development, and, quite literally,
‘beggar thy neighbour’ competition. This changing context has been drawn in to the
terrain of struggle over land, power and access at the local level as different groups try
to ﬁnd ways to position themselves to beneﬁt from the opportunities presented by
neoliberalization.
These examples of accumulation by dispossession at the local level, and the different
discourses employed by local-level actors within these conﬂicts, highlight the tensions
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within the neoliberalization of wildlife management. This is central to the changing politics
of nature-state-territory at this level. As actors struggle to ﬁnd and maintain ways to access
and beneﬁt from wildlife management, they exemplify the strategic adoption of discourse
within natural resource politics. The result is competing discourses pitched between oppos-
ing groups at the local level that are working to secure control over land and revenue from
wildlife resources.
Discussion
The neoliberalization of the wildlife sector in Tanzania has opened up new spaces to
markets for tourist hunting and wildlife-related investment agreements within WMAs,
and has resulted in green grabbing by the state and accumulation by dispossession with det-
rimental effects for some local people. However, the development of WMAs, the neoliber-
alization of wildlife management, accumulation by dispossession and green grabbing are
not things that can be understood as simply happening externally to or being inﬂicted
upon local communities. Instead, they are ongoing processes in which local actors are
actively engaged.
Discussions of neoliberalization need to consider the space for contestation and nego-
tiation that this process involves, and the ways actors across all levels are engaged in the
reshaping of conﬁgurations of power, authority and access to land and natural resources.
Here, we have referred to the politics surrounding these issues and the state-society and
nature-society relationships that shape them as the politics of nature-state-territory (see
Neumann 2004). Our view conceptualizes green grabbing not as a ﬁnal and discrete
event or act, but instead as part of the politics of the nature-state-territory relationships
being played out as different actors try to position themselves to beneﬁt from the opportu-
nities presented by neoliberalization (Peluso and Lund 2011; Sikor and Lund 2009).
As neoliberalization progresses, new institutional forms and new nature-society
relationships are produced (Büscher and Dressler 2012). In Tanzania, neoliberalization
has facilitated collaborations between local actors and NGOs in WMAs in the Authorized
Association Consortium, now engaged in political struggle around revenue and decision-
making arrangements and over central state control of wildlife resources. Important features
of the politics of nature-state-territory are the way local-level actors, ﬁrstly, negotiate their
role in revenue sharing and decision-making arrangements and, secondly, engage in pro-
cesses of accumulation by dispossession.
The strategic adoption of neoliberal discourse (see Brockington 2004) by the actors
involved in both the Authorized Association Consortium and the conﬂicts taking place
within MBOMIPA suggests complex local understandings of the values of nature. These
ideas are relevant to the creation of environmental subjects through the internalization of
values that deﬁne the way people care about the environment (environmentalities;
Agrawal 2005). Fletcher (2010) argues that neoliberal environmentalities are produced in
response to the creation of an incentive structure by the state, which then shapes
people’s decision-making and priorities in line with neoliberalization. Our examples
suggest, however, that there is a strategic element to these neoliberal environmentalities,
that actors are not always unaware of these changes and that they will try to use them to
their advantage.
We agree with Gardner (2012) that for many local actors, neoliberalization creates an
opportunity to generate real ﬁnancial beneﬁts from wildlife management. Whilst inequal-
ities and injustices are apparent, for local actors, the growth of markets based on wildlife
resources (e.g. photo tourism) is an opportunity that they do not want to miss. Non-
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consumptive tourism in WMAs substantially increased revenues received by the Author-
ized Associations (MBOMIPA revenues were USD 110,000 in 2011). This brought
funding for community development projects, although the level of these beneﬁts is gener-
ally disappointing. Certain local actors also beneﬁt substantially from their involvement
with the Authorized Association, particularly through allowances paid to its members.
The elite capture this involves (Humphries 2013) is a central feature of CBNRM in Tanza-
nia, as in other eastern and southern African countries with weak institutional environments
(Nelson and Agrawal 2008). The commodiﬁcation of wildlife resources, and the expansion
of markets for these commodities, generates patterns of winners and losers at the local as
well as the national level. Villages located close to the WMAs have seized the opportunity
to develop investment agreements for wildlife tourism activities on their own land, in com-
petition for revenue with the Authorized Association management of ofﬁcial WMA
investments.
The engagement of local actors with neoliberalization is complex. These examples from
Tanzania show local actors’ strategic adoption of neoliberal discourse and use of the chan-
ging contexts of neoliberalization to negotiate roles within wildlife management, to position
themselves to accumulate capital from wildlife resources, and to address state-society
relations with respect to wildlife management. Clearly, in the examples discussed here,
local actors cannot be described as simply resistant to neoliberalization and green grabbing
by the state and the private sector within WMAs: local actors do not attempt to challenge the
neoliberal regime of governance. Nor do local actors unconsciously take on neoliberal
environmentalities. Instead, neoliberalization is simultaneously adopted and challenged.
The dynamics of neoliberalization and the engagement of local actors in these processes
have material consequences, both through addressing the inequalities witnessed, and in
generating new sources of inequality. Tanzania is not the only country undergoing neoliber-
alization in CBNRM, and these insights point to the need to extend the consideration of the
politics of nature-state-territory that permeate these processes and their outcomes across
southern and eastern Africa, particularly in the context of the current ‘crisis’ of CBNRM
(see Dressler et al. 2010).
It is important to consider the role of local communities not simply as passive observers
of green grabbing and bearers of the inequalities facilitated by neoliberalization. Nor are
local actors representative of an awaiting uprising against state control and green grabbing.
Instead, we understand local communities as important agents within the processes of green
grabbing and accumulation by dispossession, and engaged in the politics of natural resource
management, a game for which neoliberalization is shifting the rules, and local commu-
nities are learning to play.
What we see in green grabbing and responses to it is not a new process, although as
Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones (2012) point out, it can be distinguished by the number
and variety of different actors involved, and the focus on novel forms of valuation and
the commodiﬁcation of nature. We argue here that discussion of neoliberalization and
green grabbing needs to recognize the politics of nature-state-territory of which they are
an expression. These politics have been shaped at different times in the past century by
colonial appropriation, devolved environmental management and neoliberalization. We
have witnessed these politics shift in discursive terms several times, incorporating
emphases on displacement, development, participation, land tenure and, most recently, neo-
liberalization. Whilst the focus is currently on green grabbing, it is important to note that
this is a current expression of a fundamental concern and struggle over natural resource
governance. As politico-economic philosophies change over time and new modes of
environmental governance emerge, the terminology we use to describe these politics will
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undoubtedly change again in the future, and the context in which they are played out will
continue to shift, but these struggles and their fundamental concerns over state-society and
nature-society relations with respect to land and power will remain.
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